

Message Text

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ACTION AF-18

INFO OCT-01 ARA-16 EUR-25 ISO-00 IO-14 CIAE-00 DODE-00

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PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 AID-20 OMB-01 SAJ-01

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FM AMCONSUL LOURENCO MARQUES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2285

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMCONSUL LUANDA

USUN NEW YORK 147

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 LOURENCO MARQUES 0006

DEPT PASS AS APPROPRIATE: ACCRA, CONAKRY, DAKAR, KINSHASA,
LAGOS, LONDON, LUSAKA, PARIS, PRETORIA

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, XA, PO, BR, MZ, US

SUBJECT: PORTUGAL-AFRICA-BRAZIL AND US POLICY

REF: (A) ADDIS ABABA 13*42; (B) DAR ES SALAAM 3952;
(C) USUN 4973 AND (D) BRASILIA 8042

1. SUMMARY: U.S. POLICY TOWARDS MOZAMBIQUE SHOULD BE BASED ON
WHAT THE FACTS, OUR OWN INTERESTS, AND WELFARE
OF MOZAMBICANS THEMSELVES INDICATE TO BE MOST PRACTICABLE
AND BENEFICIAL. BY SUCH TESTS OUR PRESENT POLICY IS PRAGMATIC
AND SOUND. WE BELIEVE QUICKEST AND MOST PAINLESS WAY FOR
ACHIEVING SELF-DETERMINATION FOR MOZAMBICANS IS THROUGH
CONTINUED PORTUGUESE ASSISTANCE AND FOSTERING OF DEVELOPMENT
WHICH THEY ARE IN BETTER POSITION TO DO AND MORE INTERESTED
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IN DOING THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY OR GROUP. A FRELIMO TAKEOVER,

GIVEN PRESENT ORIENTATION OF THAT ORGANIZATION, WOULD HAVE HARMFUL EFFECTS. EVEN AFTER TEN YEARS OF ARMED STRUGGLE, FRELIMO STILL DOES NOT CONTROL SIGNIFICANT PORTIONS OF COUNTRY OR COMMAND SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT AMONG POPULACE. PORTUGUESE SEEM STRONG ENOUGH TO HANG ON INDEFINITELY, BARRING UNFORESEEN DEVELOPMENTS, AND PRESENT MILITARY *TALE ATE COULD CONTINUE FOR LONG TIME. HENCE, WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE PORTUGUESE TO INTENSIFY AND SPEED UP CULTURAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGES THEY HAVE ALREADY SET IN MOTION. OUR EFFORTS MOST LIKELY SUCCEED IF THEY ARE IN THE FORM OF DISCUSSION AND QUIET DIPLOMACY, RATHER THAN PUBLIC ANTI-PORTUGUESE PRESSURE. END SUMMARY.

2. HAVE READ REFTELS WITH GREAT INTEREST, AND AM IN FULL ACCORD WITH UNDERLYING OBJECTIVE OF STRENGTHENING U.S. RELATIONS WITH OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS. DO NOT BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT USING PORTUGAL AS WHIPPING BOY WILL CONTRIBUTE VERY MUCH TO THIS END. U.S. POLICY TOWARDS PORTUGUESE AFRICAN TERRITORIES, AND TOWARDS MOZAMBIQUE IN PARTICULAR SHOULD BE BASED ON MORE THAN DESIRE GAIN APPROVAL OF OTHER COUNTRIES, OR HOPE TO AVOID BECOMING ISOLATED IN UN, OR EVEN NEED FOR CONTINUED USE OF AZORES AIR BASE. AT LEAST AS PERTINENT WOULD BE U.S. OVERALL INTEREST IN MOZAMBIQUE ITSELF, CONCERN FOR WELFARE OF EIGHT AND A HALF MILLION MOZAMBICANS, AND ACCURATE ANALYSIS OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE COUNTRY.

3. IN OUR VIEW, PRESENT U.S. POLICY TOWARDS PORTUGUESE AFRICAN TERRITORIES, WHILE PERHAPS NOT IDEAL FROM EVERY STANDPOINT, IS PRAGMATIC AND BASICALLY SOUND. U.S. HAS ALREADY EXPRESSED CLEARLY ITS OPPOSITION TO CONTINUED COLONIAL RULE IN AFRICA, AND ITS SUPPORT FOR SELF-DETERMINATION FOR PORTUGUESE AFRICAN TERRITORIES. ATTEMPTS TO PUT ITSELF "MORE SQUARELY AND LOUDLY" ON THE RECORD AS FAVORING "EARLY" SELF-DETERMINATION, "WITH OR WITHOUT" THE METROPOLE'S CONSENT, WOULD NOT BRING THAT GOAL ANY CLOSER TO REALIZATION. GIVEN PORTUGUESE SENSITIVITIES, PRIDE, AND CONVICTION IN THE RIGHTNESS OF WHAT THEY ARE DOING, SUCH PUBLIC UTTERANCES MIGHT EVEN SET BACK PRESENT TREND TOWARDS CHANGE DESCRIBED BELOW.

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RM WHAT IDEALLY WOULD US LIKE TO SEE HAPPEN IN MOZAMBIQUE - A LARGE, POTENTIALLY RICH BUT UNDERDEVELOPED AND POLITICALLY BACKWARD COUNTRY SITTING ATHWART WORLD'S MAIN OIL ROUTE AND POSSESSING SOME OF THE BEST HARBORS ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT? PRESUMABLY WE WOULD WELCOME QUICKEST FEASIBLE EVOLUTION TOWARDS SELF-DETERMINATION, RESULTING IN ESTABLISHMENT OF COMPETENT, SENSIBLE, ECONOMICALLY SECURE AND POLITICALLY STABLE GOVERNMENT, WITH WHICH US COULD CARRY ON FRIENDLY,

MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONS. AS COROLLARY, IT WOULD PRESUMABLY NOT BE IN US INTEREST TO SEE A FORCEFUL TAKEOVER OF POWER BY COMMUNIST ORIENTED OR EXTREMIST, AND PROBABLY ANTI-AMERICAN, GROUP. THIS WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN EXODUS OF MANY PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATORS, BUSINESSMEN, TEACHERS AND TECHNICIANS, WITH CONSEQUENT DETERIORATION IN MODERN PORTION OF ECONOMY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE; IN ESTABLISHMENT OF EVEN MORE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME THAN NOW EXISTS; IN MILITANT IDEOLOGICAL EXHORTATION AND APPLICATION OF TERROR; IN AN INFLUX OF FOREIGN TECHNICIANS (RUSSIAN, CHINESE, AND PERHAPS OTHER AFRICAN) WITH LITTLE KNOWLEDGE OF COUNTRY. NOT TO MENTION WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN IF SOUTH AFRICA OR RHODESIA SHOULD FEEL COMPELLED TO TAKE PREEMPTIVE MILITARY ACTION IN MOZAMBIQUE TO SAFEGUARD THEIR OWN INTERESTS.

5. ARGUMENTS THAT HEAVIER PRESSURE ON PORTUGAL OR INCREASED US SUPPORT FOR FRELIMO WOULD BENEFIT OUR TIES WITH OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS AND ENABLE US TO COMPETE WITH RUSSIA AND CHINA FOR ALLEGIANCE OF LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, DO NOT STAND UP UNDER SCRUTINY. WHILE LEANING ON PORTUGAL MIGHT EARN US TEMPORARY BROWNIE POINTS, OUR RELATIONS WITH MOST AFRICAN COUNTRIES ARE GOVERNED BY MORE FUNDAMENTAL FACTORS, SUCH AS: HISTORICAL TIES, STATUS AND LEVEL OF U.S. ECONOMIC AID, IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS, CONFLICTING ATTITUDES ON IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL ISSUES (E.G. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION), DIFFERENCES ARISING OUT OF ECONOMIC DISPARITY BETWEEN HAVES AND HAVE-NOTS; COMPLICATIONS CONNECTED WITH OUR OWN RACIAL PROBLEMS, ETC. THESE AND OTHER FACTORS WOULD CONTINUE CONTROL OUR RELATIONS WITH MOST AFRICAN COUNTRIES REGARDLESS OF ANY ACTION WE MIGHT TAKE AGAINST PORTUGAL. FURTHER, ANYTHING WE MIGHT REALISTICALLY CONTEMPLATE DOING TO HELP LIBERATION MOVEMENTS WOULD HARDLY BE IN SAME LEAGUE AS PLENTIFUL MILITARY AND TRAINING AID THEY ALREADY RECEIVE FROM RUSSIA
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AND CHINA, AND HENCE NOT LIKELY TO AFFECT THEIR POLITICAL ORIENTATION, OR INDUCE THEM TO SWITCH TO US.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 LOURENCO MARQUES 0006

6. DOES PRESENT STATUS OF FRELIMO INSURGENCY WARRANT CHANGE IN OUR POLICY? JUDGING FROM WHAT WE HAVE SEEN IN WAR TO DATE AND FROM WHAT WE LEARN FROM PORTUGUESE AND OTHER OBSERVERS, FRELIMO DID NOT , EVEN AFTER TEN YEARS OF ARMED INSURGENCY, EXERCISE SUBSTANTIAL CONTROL OVER SIGNIFICANT AREAS OR NUMBERS OF PEOPLE, EXCEPT PERHAPS ON MACONDE PLATEAU IN NORTH EAST CORNER OF CABO DELGADO DISTRICT. IN CERTAIN OTHER SPARSELY INHABITED AREAS, FRELIMO CAN SET UP TEMPORARY BUSH SCHOOLS AND FIRST AID HUTS, COLLECT OCCASIONAL TAXES, AND SPONSOR SMALL BARTER TRADE ACROSS BORDERS OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. BUT IT DOES NOT EXERCISE PERMANENT GOVERNING POWERS. GRADUAL EXTENSION DURING PAST YEAR OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY SOUTHWARD INTO VILA PEREIRA AND BEIRA DISTRICTS HAS DISRUPTIVE NUISANCE VALUE, BUT DOES NOT YET COMPRISE CONTROL. FRELIMO UNABLE EXCLUDE PORTUGUESE FROM ANY PORTION OF COUNTRY LATTER DESIRE TO ENTER. RECENT DEFECTIONS OF IMPORTANT FRELIMO MEMBERS, INDICATE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES INSIDE FRELIMO ORGANIZATION. NO ACCURATE WAY TO MEASURE EXTENT OF SUPPORT OR
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SYMPATHY FOR FRELIMO AMONG POPULACE. WE WOULD GUESS THAT THE IDEA OF A FRELIMO FIGHTING FOR INDEPENDENCE PROBABLY AFFORDS SOLACE TO MANY AFRICANS WHO RESENT PORTUGUESE OVERLORDSHIP, BUT CURRENT FRELIMO LEADERSHIP AND IDEOLOGY ARE NOT WIDELY ACCEPTED, AND LEADERS NOT SUFFICIENTLY KNOWLEDGEABLE TO RUN A COUNTRY.

7. WE ARE THUS LEFT WITH PORTUGUESE AS MOST TECHNICALLY QUALIFIED GROUP WITH SUFFICIENT RESOURCES (LIMITED THOUGH THEY MAY BE), AND INTEREST TO BENEFIT MOZAMBIQUE. BARRING UNFORESEEN DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN PORTUGAL, OR DRASTIC INCREASE IN FRELIMO STRENGTH DUE TO ACQUISITION OF MORE POWERFUL WEAPONS OR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION BY OUTSIDE ELEMENTS, PORTUGUESE, EVEN WITH THEIR ANTIQUATED MILITARY EQUIPMENT, APPEAR ABLE TO HANG ON INDEFINITELY. FROM WHICH IT FOLLOWS THAT ANY CHANGED STATUS FOR MOZAMBIQUE NO *SUPPORTED OR TOLERATED BY PORTUGUESE IS UNLIKELY MATERIALIZE VERY SOON. WE CONCLUDE THAT ALTHOUGH THE TIMING WE WOULD HOPE FOR MAY NOT COINCIDE WITH ANY SCHEDULE PORTUGUESE WOULD PRESENTLY ACCEPT, QUICKEST AND MOST PAINLESS WAY FOR MOZAMBICANS TO REACH STAGE WHERE THEY CAN DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE IS TO PROCEED ALONG PATH ON WHICH PORTUGUESE PRESENTLY ARE STROLLING, EVEN THOUGH LATTER WOULD NOT ACKNOWLEDGE IN SO MANY WORDS THAT THEY ARE EVEN CONTEMPLATING SELF-DETERMINATION IN OUR SENSE OF THE TERM. HOWEVER, LATEST CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES PROVIDING FOR INCREASED AUTONOMY FOR OVERSEAS TERRITORIES; GROWING AFRICAN PARTICIPATION IN ADMINISTRATION AND RECENT "ELECTION" OF NON-WHITE MAJORITY TO MOZAMBIKAN LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY; ADVANCES IN EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES AND GROWING NUMBERS OF AFRICANS EMPLOYED IN MORE SKILLED JOBS; EMPHASIS ON MULTI-RACIALITY; PROGRESS IN ALDEAMENTO PROGRAM WITH ACCOMPANYING SOCIAL CHANGES; EMBRYONIC POLITICAL STIRRINGS WITHIN THE COUNTRY; APPOINTMENT OF NEW, REPUTEDLY MORE LIBERAL OVERSEAS MINISTER; ALL HOLD PROMISE FOR CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGE. JUDGING FROM HISTORY OF SIMILAR DEVELOPMENTS IN OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES DURING THEIR PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE, SUCH CHANGES CONTAIN BUILT-IN, SELF-ACCELERATIVE PROCESSES WHICH MAY QUICKEN THE PACE BEYOND THE ORIGINAL INTENT OR EXPECTATION OF PORTUGUESE SPONSORS. ONE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT AFTER WORLD WAR II, WHEN BRITISH FIRST DECIDED TO GRANT INDEPENDENCE TO THEIR AFRICAN COLONIES, IT

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STILL TOOK YEARS FOR THESE TO EMERGE AS SELF-GOVERNING UNITS, EVEN THOUGH AS EARLY AS THE NINETEEN FORTIES THEY HAD MORE NUMEROUS TRAINED AND MORE POLITICALLY CONSCIOUS HUMAN RESOURCES THAN THOSE AVAILABLE TODAY IN MOZAMBIQUE.

8. QUESTION IS HOW, WHETHER TO WHAT EXTENT US CAN PERSUADE PORTUGUESE TO SPEED THINGS UP, GIVEN THEIR LIMITED RESOURCES, AND THE FEW PRACTICAL MEANS WE HAVE OF EXERTING PRESSURE. MERELY TO PROCLAIM MORE POSITIVELY THE ABHORRANCE OF COLONIALISM WHICH WE ARE ALREADY FIRMLY ON RECORD AS FEELING WILL NOT HAVE MUCH INFLUENCE. THREAT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DOES NOT HOLD OUT MUCH HOPE, AND WOULD ONLY MAKE

MOZAMBIQUE MORE DEPENDENT THAN EVER ON ITS SOUTHERN AND WESTERN NEIGHBORS, THUS BRINGING CLOSER THE PROSPECT OF A "WHITE REDOUBT" WE HAVE LONG SOUGHT TO AVOID. THERE ARE FEW "SUBSIDIES" WE GIVE TO PORTUGAL, SO THERE IS LITTLE FOR US

TO WITHHOLD. PRESUMABLY OUR VOTES AT UN ON RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING PORTUGAL ARE DETERMINED ON MERIT BASIS RATHER THAN ON FRIENDSHIP, BUT IF WE SHOULD START VOTING FOR RESOLUTIONS WE KNOW TO BE UNENFORCEABLE AND OF DOUBTFUL LEGALITY JUST TO PLEASE THE MAJORITY OF UN MEMBERS, WE STAND TO LOSE A VALUABLE ASSET TOWARDS INFLUENCING THE PORTUGUESE, I.E. THEIR RESPECT FOR OUR OBJECTIVITY. FAILURE OF OUR EFFORTS IN EARLY NINETEEN SIXTIES DEMONSTRATES THAT WE HAVE LITTLE CHANCE OF FORCING PORTUGUESE TO ADOPT MEASURES OR ACCEPT CONCEPTS THEY HAVE OPPOSED FOR CENTURIES. THIS LEAVES AS MOST HOPEFUL POSSIBILITY, OUR BEING ABLE TO PERSUADE THEM TO MODIFY AND EXPAND POLICIES THEY HAVE ALREADY SHOWN THEMSELVES WILLING TO UNDERTAKE. FOR THIS OBJECTIVE PATIENCE, SOFT-SELL, QUIET DIPLOMACY, AND THE INTRA-FAMILIAL STYLE ADVOCATED BY BRAZILIANS (REF D) ARE MORE LIKELY BE INFLUENTIAL WITH PORTUGUESE THAN THE STRIDENT MEASURES MORE LIKELY TO APPEAL TO THEIR AFRICAN OPPONENTS.
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